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I . W H Y P H I L O S O P H E R S ARE E Q U I P P E D T O RULE 
In his blueprint for an ideal society, the Socrates of Plato's Republic 
emphasizes three especially daring political proposals: first, inclu-
sion of women in the guardian class, on fully equal terms with men,· 
second, abolition of the family for this same elite class; and third, that 
philosophers should be kings. He speaks of these as three "waves" 
(5.457b-d, 472a, 473C-d), with the final proposal, that of philosopher-
kings, heralded as the third and biggest wave within the "triple wave" 
[trikumia, 5.472a). 
Quite how destabilizing these proposals are meant to sound can 
be appreciated only when we realize that Socrates is referring here 
not just to stormy waves but to a veritable tsunami of change. Not 
only have tsunamis been a familiar feature of Mediterranean his-
tory in both ancient and modern times, but eyewitness accounts of 
tsunamis - including the massive one in the Indian Ocean on Decem-
ber 26, 2004 - again and again describe a sequence of three waves, an 
indication that it is this specific phenomenon that Plato is calling 
to mind.1 When Socrates speaks of a third and final wave as liable 
to "drown us in a deluge [katakluzein] of mockery and unbelievabil-
ity" (5.473c), his reference is, if I am not mistaken, to a philosophical 
tsunami, a veritable cataclysm of incredulity that threatens to wash 
away his entire political agenda. 
1
 Two passages from Athenian tragedy suggest to me an audience familiar with the 
tsunami phenomenon: ( 1 ) a giant wave ( "with trikumia" ) preceded by an earthquake 
(Eur. Hippolytus 1198-214) and (2) a triple wave preceded by the sucking down of 
the sea ( Aesch. Septem 7 5 8-61 ). Both these phenomena regularly precede a tsunami. 
I develop the theme in Sedley 2005. 
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We should bear in mind too that a tsunami could, like that at 
Helike on the Gulf of Corinth in 373 B.C.,2 be sufficiently powerful 
to wipe out an existing city and require its wholesale re-creation. 
In advocating the institution of philosopher-kings, Socrates shows 
himself well aware (7.54od-54ia) that he is doing nothing less revo-
lutionary than that. 
Why then, despite the expected incredulity, should philosophers 
rule? Why, in Plato's Callipolis, does their privileged acquaintance 
with the transcendent Forms uniquely equip philosophers for the 
tasks of government? Socrates' answer is conveyed by one formal 
argument, followed up by a series of images. I start with a brief look 
at the argument, a famous and controversial one located at the very 
end of Book 5 (476d-48oa).3 
This argument is envisaged as addressed not to the Republic's 
philosophical interlocutors or readership but to an imaginary group 
of unphilosophical although culturally informed citizens who might 
well pride themselves on possessing knowledge, in an effort to per-
suade them that they have no such thing and should for this very 
reason put their welfare in the hands of philosopher-kings, who do. 
Characterized as "lovers of sights and sounds," they are in effect 
cultured individuals who seek to fill their lives with all manner of 
beautiful things, yet lack any understanding of the unitary essence 
of beauty, an essence that Platonically informed readers will equate 
with the Form of beauty, or "the Beautiful itself. " Since members of 
this nonphilosophical intelligentsia have no awareness of any such 
transcendent entity, they are unlikely to accept initially that the 
philosophers have a stronger claim to knowledge than they them-
selves have. Nevertheless, they might yet be convinced, by a highly 
schematic mapping out of the relation of cognitive states to onto-
logical realms that Socrates proceeds to develop. Beauty here will 
serve as no more than an example: the lessons about its understand-
ing, when they emerge, will be readily extended to such concepts4 as 
2
 Strabo 8.7.1.55-2.4, 8.7.2.21-38; Pausanias 7.24.12.1-10. 
3
 There is a large literature on this passage. For a reading radically different from 
the one adopted here, see Fine 1978, summarized and updated in Fine 1999a. Both 
articles are reprinted in Fine 2003. 
4
 I use "concept," here and elsewhere, to indicate the object or content of a conception. 
By calling a Form a concept, I do not mean to imply that it is merely that, i.e., that 
it has no being independently of being conceived. 
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justice and goodness, which lie even closer to the core of the dia-
logue's argument. For even goodness, the very highest item in the 
Republic's metaphysical scheme and said to be "beyond being" 
(6.509b), is for the philosopher a bona fide object of knowledge and 
definition (7.533D-C). 
Knowledge, the nonphilosophers are first asked to agree, is of 
what is. There has been much scholarly dispute about the precise 
meaning of this last phrase, but for present purposes suffice it to say 
that in classical Greek usage "what is" typically expands into "what 
is something or other" (and not, for example, into "what exists"). 
Hence knowledge is of what is simply because, for any given sub-
ject X and predicate F, you can know X to be F if and only if X is 
F The same will apply even if the ". . . is . . ." proposition is not 
an ordinary predication but, for example, a statement of definitional 
identity. Hence knowing the definition of some Form, for instance, 
that (as argued in Book 4) justice is a certain interrelation of three 
parts, would be an excellent illustration of how and why knowledge 
is of "what is." (That this unqualified mode of being entails the sub-
ject's existence is not doubted by Plato, but that entailment is not 
enough to make the "be" in question existential in sense.) 
Second, the nonphilosophers are expected to agree that "knowl-
edge", an infallible power, is a cognitive faculty different from mere 
fallible "opinion" (doxa). Other cognitive faculties are distinguished 
from each other by having distinct objects - vision being of color, 
hearing of sound, and so on - and the same is taken to apply to 
knowledge and opinion. Hence knowledge and opinion are agreed to 
have different objects. 
Although the inferential moves here (5477c-478a) have rightly 
been regarded with some suspicion, the argument voices a deep-
seated conviction of Plato's. Since knowledge can by its very def-
inition never become false, its object must be such as to be inca-
pable of falsifying it, as it would threaten to do if it could undergo 
change. Therefore the object of knowledge is something incapable 
of change. Opinion, by contrast, being variably true and false, is 
inherently subject to revision, a feature that implies that its objects 
are, correspondingly, items that are liable to change. 
What then are their respective objects? Since knowledge has 
already been agreed to be of what is, and since opinion cannot be 
plausibly correlated to what is not (which would correspond rather 
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to a cognitive faculty or quasi-faculty that systematically achieves 
falsehood, "ignorance" as Socrates chooses to call it), the object of 
opinion must lie between these two extremes. Opinion, thus, has as 
its object whatever it is that "fluctuates between what completely 
is not and what completely is" (5.479dl. 
So far this is no doubt too abstract and schematic to shed much 
light on anything. But what the nonphilosophical aesthetes are 
meant to be now better placed to understand is the following. The 
kind of beauty that they pursue - that of beautiful songs, paintings, 
statues, and so on - is of an irremediably fluctuating kind. The same 
things that count as beautiful in one context, perspective, aspect, or 
historical period5 count as ugly in others. The aesthetes' evaluations 
are therefore subject to constant revision. Or, in the idiom of the cur-
rent argument, "the many beautiful things" that they prize in fact 
fluctuate between being and not being beautiful. In other words, 
what "fluctuates between what completely is not and what com-
pletely is," the ontological class they have agreed to be the object of 
mere unstable opinion rather than of knowledge, turns out to match 
perfectly the very kind of object with whose pursuit they themselves 
are most concerned. Any aspiration they may have had to knowledge 
must be relinquished. Their chosen realm is one of shifting, perspec-
tival opinion. 
If only they understood the Form of beauty as well, they would 
appreciate that true cognition of it, in total contrast, is immune to 
such revision. When you come to know the essence or definition of 
beauty, you acquire understanding of an unchangeable truth that no 
more invites later revision than (Plato might say) your understand-
ing of the properties of the number 2 could ever become out of date 
or inapplicable. What beauty itself is, it simply and unequivocally 
is. It is precisely by their detachment from the here and now, and 
their intellectual gravitation to the realm occupied by the changeless 
Forms, that philosophers gain cognitive access to Being, thus exer-
cising the only faculty that can correctly be called "knowledge. " The 
nonphilosophers do not know what they are missing, since they have 
5
 At 5.479a-b the argument fails to specify these and other ways in which opposites are 
liable to be compresent, but readers were no doubt expected to be familiar with them 
from other dialogues, notably, from Symposium 211a. There again the example is 
beauty, for whose cultural instability cf. 4.424b (quoting Homer, Odyssey 1.3 51-52] 
with Adam 1963 [1902] adloc., 452c, Laws 660b. 
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never themselves distinguished Forms from their sensible instances. 
Nevertheless, the formal argument is meant to be sufficient to per­
suade them that they do not after all possess knowledge. 
But why would this knowledge of unchanging Forms be the rele­
vant kind of understanding required for administration of an entity, 
such as the city, that is inherently subject to change? The problem is 
exacerbated if the argument is taken to imply that, since knowledge's 
objects are limited to things incapable of change, the city's affairs are 
not even in principle capable of being "known." On such a reading, 
you can "know" what justice is, but no one, not even a philoso­
pher, can comparably "know" that this or that policy is just, given 
only that in some circumstances or from some point of view that 
same policy is also unjust. This restriction of "know" may sound 
like a merely linguistic reform on Plato's part, but it is in reality 
much more than that, for it underwrites Plato's enterprise, central 
to the Republic, of radically reconceiving who or what a real political 
expert is. 
Hence, although it is understandable that scholars have some­
times sought to rescue Plato from commitment to the implication 
that particulars cannot be known,6 it will prove not only safer but 
also ultimately more enlightening to embrace that implication. For 
in both reflecting and developing Plato's two-world metaphysics, 
such a thesis throws light on a tension in Plato's thought that 
will take center stage in the second half of the present chapter: 
on the one hand, knowledge is essentially unworldly, and is best 
exercised and enjoyed by philosophers operating altogether outside 
civic structures; on the other hand, the proper running of the civic 
structures themselves vitally depends on those who possess the 
6
 This alternative has been best defended by Fine (references in note 3). She opposes 
the "two worlds" interpretation that I am assuming and according to which knowl­
edge and opinion are distinguished primarily by their objects, and instead holds 
that they are distinguished by their contents: knowledge's contents are always true, 
opinion's can be true or false. It seems to me that the objects analysis is strongly 
supported by the ensuing cave simile, where cognitive states are in effect defined by 
their objects. Fine and others have pointed out that at 520c the philosophers return­
ing to the cave are told "you will know what the individual images are and what 
they are of," but this is weak evidence because Socrates is here engaged in using 
the idiom of the cave simile (cf. an immediately preceding reference to "darkness"), 
and not his preferred epistemological vocabulary. In a more technical passage such 
as 484c-d, one that capitalizes directly on the Book 5 argument, he seems careful 
to limit the good politician's "knowledge" to that of Forms. 
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knowledge being willing to apply it to the city's administration. 
For despite the fact, noted above, that in Plato's eyes you cannot, 
even in principle, "know" that a given policy is just, your ability to 
arrive at the (temporarily) correct "opinion" that in current circum-
stances such a policy is the most just will depend on prior knowledge, 
namely, your knowledge of what justice itself is. 
Exactly how philosophical knowledge is meant to inform politi-
cal activity is illuminated only when we move on to the celebrated 
similes in Books 6 and 7, of which I focus on two in particular. 
Take first the simile of the Ship of State (6.4876-4890). The 
philosopher in existing society - exemplified here by a thoroughly 
Athenian-sounding democracy - is compared to an expert navigator 
trying in vain to make his voice heard on a ship where the crew 
(representing demagogues) have taken control, after drugging the 
rather deaf and short-sighted captain (the "people" or demos). These 
sailors flatly deny that navigation is an expertise, and they deride 
the expert when he insists that knowledge of winds and stars is 
required if one is to sail a ship correctly. They dismiss him as a 
mere "sky-watcher and chatterbox" (488e-489a, 489c). This derisive 
description echoes a phraseology that Plato's Socrates elsewhere uses 
with implicit approval [Crat. 40ib7~9, Phdr. ijoai-, cf. also its use 
at Pol. 299b), thus appropriating and turning to his own advantage 
the charges that were to be brought against him at his trial (cf. Apol. 
18b). We are thereby invited to recognize in the expert navigator a 
thoroughly Socrates-like figure. 
This expert's understanding of the stars, contrasted with the 
sailors' scornful ignorance of them, represents a gulf in communica-
tion between philosophers and the rest of society that Plato in the 
Republic seeks to display at its starkest, as a first step toward its 
eventual bridging. There can be no possible doubt that the stars in 
the Ship of State simile symbolize the Forms. And just as the stars 
with their unfailing regularities are, unbeknown to the crew, vital to 
the navigation of the ship, so too in Plato's eyes it is only by reference 
to absolute and unvarying values, equated as usual with Forms, that 
an intrinsically unstable entity like the city can be well regulated.7 
The same point is further elucidated by the cave simile that opens 
Book 7. Its main epistemological lesson lies in the following contrast. 
7
 Cf. 7.521a on the need for "a single aim" in those who govern a city. 
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On the one hand, there are the bound prisoners in the cave, whose 
exclusive reliance on shadows cast by statues and other manufac-
tured objects that are themselves artificial images of beings in the 
outside world represents the level of understanding found in ordi-
nary citizens not only of a nonideal city like Athens, but also of 
the hypothesized Callipolis. On the other hand, there is the philoso-
pher who, following his release, has absorbed the reality of the out-
side world before returning to the cave. Although (a point I shall 
develop shortly) this returning philosopher is initially portrayed as a 
Socratic figure, uniquely achieving enlightenment in a nonideal city 
and rewarded for his pains by the uncomprehending hostility of his 
fellow citizens, he becomes in due course emblematic of the class of 
philosophers whose education the ideal city promotes, orchestrates, 
and values. 
First, why are the chained prisoners described by Socrates as "like 
us" (515a)? Their epistemological state unmistakably matches the 
one Socrates has earlier called "conjecture," "fancy," or "imagina-
tion" (eikasia, 509d-5iie), which amounts to basing one's experi-
ence on mere images of sensible particulars that are themselves mere 
images of Forms. Why are "we" like that? Don't we have innumer-
able daily experiences of sensible objects themselves, unmediated 
by their images? The answer to this old puzzle8 lies, I believe, in 
the first sentence of Book 7: the cave is to be an allegory, not of 
our general cognitive state but of our educational state ("our nature 
as regards education and lack of education," 514a). It is education-
ally, then, that we all are, or at any rate start out, like the prisoners. 
Our woeful distance from fundamental truths could be illustrated 
in terms of mathematical education, as the mathematical focus of 
the ensuing educational program encourages us to do - see especially 
7-532b-d, which insists that the entire process from the prisoner's 
first release to his looking up to the objects casting shadows out-
side the cave describes mathematical education. Nothing in the text 
suggests that such a reading exhausts the simile's meaning, and the 
references to education in general as its scope (7.514a) and to shadows 
of statues of justice (7.517dl are among many pointers that suggest 
8
 An outstanding recent study of the cave, Wilberding 2004, uses the need to solve 
this puzzle as a starting point for a radically new interpretation of the entire image. 
I cannot here address his interpretation, but I believe that the very simple solution 
I offer to the puzzle makes the reinterpretation at any rate unnecessary. 
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the contrary. Nevertheless, mathematical education is undoubtedly 
one of the image's applications.9 Our distance from fundamental 
truths could also be illustrated in terms of society's dependence 
on poets like Homer as the source of all wisdom, as Socrates will 
show in Book 10 when he ranks poetry at two removes from real-
ity, closely mimicking the cave's ontological and epistemological 
hierarchy. 
But for our present inquiry it is more appropriate to concentrate on 
another educational topic suggested by the Republic itself, namely, 
education about justice. 
That the cave is to be interpreted as illustrating, among other 
things, the abysmal incomprehension of justice among nonphiloso-
phers becomes clear when the returning philosopher, dazzled by 
the outside light, can no longer see properly, and anyway no longer 
takes seriously the guessing games that the prisoners play about the 
sequence in which the shadows will appear. As a result he looks 
ridiculous and incompetent to the prisoners, who warn against any-
one else following the example he has set and who would kill him 
if only they could get their hands on him (7.5166-5173). That is, 
a philosopher in an ordinary city will inevitably look dangerously 
unworldly, because his mind is on higher things. And where does he 
manifest this apparent unworldliness? Socrates describes him as cut-
ting a poor figure "when forced, in the law courts and elsewhere, to 
contend about the shadows of what is just or about the statues whose 
shadows they are, and to enter debates about this [i.e., about what is 
just] using the assumptions about these things made by people who 
have never seen Justice itself" (7.5i7d-e). It is clear that a demo-
cratic city like Athens is envisaged, in which both in the law courts 
"and elsewhere" -meaning such political contexts as the assembly 
and council - the citizens engage in debates about what decisions 
will be just. The special focus on the law courts is explained by 
the oblique authorial allusion to Socrates' own future trial and con-
demnation. For Socrates was not known as a regular participant in 
9
 Briefly, I take it that the prisoner's turning round to look at the statues and other 
manufactured images would represent the sensory pursuit of mathematics, as illus-
trated in the Meno-, that the shadows and reflections outside the cave represent 
mathematical intermediates, that is, perfect intelligible images of mathematical 
Forms; and, of course, that the objects casting those reflections symbolize the math-
ematical Forms themselves. 
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discussions at the assembly or council. It is natural that Plato should 
want to put the focus instead on the Athenian law courts, where 
Socrates, for all his intellectual brilliance, was unable to secure him-
self an acquittal and where his fellow citizens, or in the language 
of the allegory his fellow prisoners, did indeed manage to get their 
hands on him and kill him. The parable thus represents, among other 
things, the Athenian democracy's treatment of the paradigmatic 
philosopher. 
But I have jumped ahead to the story of the returning philosopher. 
Let me go back and ask about his original release from the cave. 
In the courts and assembly, we have seen, they argue about "the 
shadows of what is just or about the statues whose shadows they 
are." If the shadows constitute the whole of their experience, how 
can the prisoners argue about the objects casting them as well? To see 
why it is put this way, we must ask what the statues and shadows 
represent in the case of justice. The relevant statues in this part 
of the allegory are those depicting whatever item outside the cave 
symbolizes the Form of justice. In which case what these man-made 
statues stand for more specifically are human acts or decisions that 
mimic the true nature of justice with sufficient success to merit 
the predicate "just," albeit still incompletely, as Plato's metaphysics 
requires. The regular guessing games about which shadow will come 
along next might symbolize, for example, a debate in the assembly as 
to whether a proposed decree is just. Behind the prisoners are one or 
more statues representing the genuinely just decision to take in this 
situation; but all that the prisoners see are the shadows, or inadequate 
pretenses, of it that are danced in front of them by unscrupulous 
orators.10 Normally, then, in both the assembly and the courts, the 
10
 In saying this, I do not mean to identify these orators, demagogues, sophists, and 
other manipulators with any individuals portrayed in the cave simile. They cannot 
easily be equated with either (1) bound prisoners (if they were, how could they con-
trol the shadows?) or (2) the mysterious people carrying the manufactured images 
(or they would turn out to be, contrary to Plato's conviction, the most enlightened 
people in the city, uniquely able to tell real instances of justice from their fraud-
ulent imitations). If (2) have any secure identity, they might be gods or daimons, 
conveying to us dependable guidance that we choose to ignore, or more plausibly 
the established laws of the city, which from Crito to Laws Plato tended to credit 
with an at least semi-authoritative status (an authority linked at Laws 7130-7148 
to that of daimons). As for orators and their ilk, it is safer to conclude that the 
imagery does not specifically cater to them. 
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arguments must be limited to being about the shadows. If the debate 
might sometimes extend to talk about the statues too, as Socrates 
indicates, the natural explanation is that this represents an attempt 
by an enlightened speaker, like the returning philosopher, to raise 
the level of discussion above the rhetorical fictions that are jostling 
for attention. If so, this talk will, sadly, fall on uncomprehending 
ears. 
How the future philosopher is first released is left mysterious in 
the cave simile. This silence is understandable, because the answer 
would be very different in an ideal and a nonideal city, both of which 
are represented by the simile at different points. In an ideal city, the 
education system itself will bring about the release of the suitably 
gifted. In a nonideal city, there is nothing about the civic conditions 
as such that can account for the emergence of a philosopher (7.519a-
b), so Plato is wise not to supply any symbolism for it. But we may 
guess that this incipient philosopher is already, while still tied up, 
refusing to play the games about justice that the assembly and law 
courts encourage, and instead insists on working out for himself what 
is just in each situation. By doing so, that is, by looking for the gen-
uinely just act or decision behind the oratorical façade, he is already 
inserting into the talk about shadows some hypothetical reference 
to the objects that may be casting them. What, then, would be more 
natural than that, if he finds a way, he should force himself to turn 
round and look at those objects? Insofar as Socrates' own life is the 
model for the prisoner's escape, we may think once more of his char-
acteristic insistence, when confronted with unlawful pressures, on 
making his own independent assessment of what action was just.11 
At this stage of his release, although now free, our emerging 
philosopher is still inside the cave, that is, operating within the con-
fines of the sensible world, dealing only with the merits of particular 
cases of justice and injustice.12 But it is almost inevitable that he 
11
 Notably, Ap. 32a-e. 
12
 Although, within the ideal city, this phase bears some resemblance to the fif-
teen years of practical administrative experience scheduled for the trainee rulers 
(7-539e-54oaL it differs in coming before, rather than after, their fifteen years of 
higher education. It therefore corresponds rather to their initial education, up to 
the age of twenty, as described in Books 2 and 3, an education designed to max-
imize their exposure through reformed cultural media to genuinely good models 
and other influences. 
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should next, however painful the transition may be, drag himself up 
into the outside world. For that world represents the world of Forms, 
and there alone can he seek the answer to the question that is now 
at the top of his agenda: what is justice? 
Once in the intelligible world, we are told, he is at first so dazzled 
that he cannot look at the objects around him, one of which repre-
sents justice. All that he can manage is to look down at its reflection 
in a pool or its shadow on the ground. Only later will he be able to 
raise his eyes and look at the object casting this shadow or reflection, 
in other words, in our chosen example, to study the Form of justice 
directly in its own right. 
What is represented by this intermediate stage, when shadows and 
reflections are all that he can directly contemplate? The shadows 
and reflections obviously enough symbolize images of Forms, but, 
since the region outside the cave represents the intelligible world, 
these will be intelligible images of Forms, not sensible images such 
as the statues and other manufactured replicas inside the cave must 
stand for. The shadows' ontological superiority to the statues is con-
veyed not only by this difference, but also by the fact that they 
are depicted as natural rather than merely artificial images. Admit-
tedly, the manufactured images in the cave and the shadows and 
reflections outside are alike to the extent that both represent direct 
images of Forms,· and the mathematical fact - never explicitly men-
tioned, but surely known to Plato13 - that the two middle sections 
of the line [pistis, "trust," and dianoia, "thought") must be equal 
reflects this partial metaphysical parity between their respective 
objects, I suggest. Nevertheless, the escaped prisoner's upward move 
from sensible to intelligible images of Forms undoubtedly represents 
intellectual progress, and our next task is to work out what that 
consists in. 
Now a sensible image of the Form of justice would be exempli-
fied by a person, like Aristides, or a city, such as Sparta, judged to 
deserve the epithet "just, " but still with an unavoidable compresence 
of injustice.14 For according to Platonic metaphysics all sensible par-
ticulars suffer from this deficiency, whereby they never participate 
13
 On this point, and for an account of the Line, see N. Denyer's chapter 11 in this 
volume. 
14
 Cf. 5479a-b. 
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in one Form without also participating, in some respect, in the oppo-
site Form. That is precisely the reason why, in Plato's eyes, no study 
of particular cases of a given property can ever lead all the way to 
knowledge of that property in its own right. 
We can infer, then, that the reason why the progression from see-
ing statues inside the cave to seeing shadows and reflections outside 
it represents an advance in understanding is that it corresponds to 
progress from studying justice through sensible instances, for exam-
ple, by investigating an individual imperfectly just state like Sparta, 
to studying it through an intelligible instance. What could this latter 
be? A satisfying answer is provided by the procedure that has already 
been followed in Republic 2-4 for arriving at a definition of justice. 
For that definition was sought and found by first constructing and 
examining an idealized exemplar of justice: a perfect image of the 
Form of justice, namely, the ideal city. The ideal city is not itself 
the Form of justice,15 and indeed it manifests justice no more than 
it does all the other cardinal virtues. However, thanks to not being 
a sensible exemplar, and thus not restricted by the usual limitations 
of sensible instantiations of Forms, it is perfectly just, as well as per-
fectly wise, and so on (4.427e; cf. 50id). Because of this perfection, it 
proved possible in Book 4 for Socrates and his interlocutors to read 
off from it the definitions of those virtues in a way that would have 
been impossible when looking at, for example, a Sparta or an Athens 
and seeking to disentangle its just aspects from its unjust aspects. 
When our escaped prisoner finally raises his eyes from the shadow 
or reflection of justice to the Form itself, he is making exactly that 
move, working from a perfect intelligible model in order to arrive at 
the definition of the Form of justice. 
He has still not finished his education about justice, however. The 
escaped prisoner lets his eyes, now used to the light, travel further, 
not only over the beings all around him, but up to the heavenly 
bodies, until finally he can look at the sun (representing the Form of 
Good), in the light of which he now fully understands the new world 
around him for the first time. 
Actually, it seems a credible conjecture that a value Form like jus-
tice, being so closely akin to goodness (the sun) itself, is represented 
15
 See Burnyeat 1992. He argues, rightly, that the Republic's ideal city is not a Form 
at all (pp. 298-99 of the reprint). 
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by one of the heavenly bodies (cf. 5i6a-b), rather than by one of the 
terrestrial beings populating the region outside the cave. If so, the 
ship simile and the cave simile come together at this point: in both, 
the heavenly bodies symbolize those entities - the moral Forms -
by reference to which the philosopher alone would be able to govern 
the city. 
There has been much debate and uncertainty as to why the Good 
is supposed by Plato to have the role of making the other Forms 
intelligible. The majority of scholars believe that goodness is a con-
cept presupposed by, and therefore required for understanding, the 
"ideal" properties that the Forms possess qua Forms, in particu-
lar, their perfection.16 I doubt whether this is either linguistically 
or philosophically the best answer. Linguistically, it is question-
able whether "good" (agathos) - rather than, say, "perfect" [teleios), 
"pure" (eilikrinës), or "correct" (orthos) - is a natural Greek word for 
the kind of perfection with which Forms exhibit the properties they 
stand for. Philosophically, the progress of the prisoner escaping the 
cave has given us reason to think not only that an ideal exemplar is 
as good or perfect a model of F-ness as the Form is, but that it can 
be grasped in its perfection even by someone who does not yet know 
the Good itself. Besides, Forms have other, equally important ideal 
properties, such as unity and eternal being, leaving it even less clear 
why perfection in particular should be singled out.17 
Rather, I take it18 that goodness stands over other Forms because 
it accounts for the proper concept specific to each Form, be it justice, 
16
 This idea is much too widely advocated (or, in many cases, assumed) in the modern 
literature for me to document it here. The fullest articulations of it that I know are 
by G. Santas - see Santas 1980 and 2001, ch. 5. It is particularly well developed by 
M. Miller (chapter 12 in this volume), and I am aware that in the space available I 
am doing less than justice to his account. 
17
 See note 21 below against the view that goodness is unity. If it were, then the view I 
am opposing might have to hold that goodness is what enables us to understand the 
uniqueness, rather than the perfection, of each Form. It is hard, however, to believe 
that Plato thinks the ultimate purpose of five years of dialectic lies in the need to 
understand what makes each Form one, especially when arithmetic already has 
unity as its special focus. For a more nuanced discussion of how goodness might 
relate to unity, see M. Miller's chapter 12 in this volume. 
18
 My views on this have something in common with those of R. Patterson (Pat-
terson 1985) and of N. Denyer (chapter n in this volume), both of whom give 
a more richly teleological account of the Forms' goodness than the majority of 
interpreters. 
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largeness, oddness, or (possibly even) man. Take justice first. Even if 
you have successfully formulated a definition of justice, you don't 
fully understand it until you have worked out what makes justice 
good.19 Since justice is a value, the point is a readily intelligible 
one: no one, it might be said, could fully understand any given value 
without even knowing what goodness itself is. Although Republic 
4 has already formulated a definition of justice, we were there told 
by Socrates that his route to it was a shortcut (435c-d), and in Book 
6 (504b-d) he made it explicit that the "longer route" which was 
thus avoided would have been one via the Good. Thus the dialogue's 
definitional task regarding justice was not really completed in Book 
4, and could not be completed by anyone who had not first reached an 
understanding of the Good itself - a task that according to Socrates 
requires ten years of preparatory mathematical studies, followed by 
five years of dialectic, culminating in a fully defended analysis of the 
Good. Only people with that level of education - an elite to which 
Socrates protests that he does not himself belong (6.5o6b-c) - could 
expect to understand not only what justice is, but, given that justice 
is as the definition says it is, precisely how it reflects or embodies 
goodness. 
Seeing why justice should be thought to be fully intelligible only 
in the light of goodness is in fact a relatively easy task. Seeing why 
the same is true of man (if there is such a Form) should also not 
prove too problematic: if a human being is to be understood in terms 
of a divinely ordained function, as Plato holds, and if that function 
is, in effect, the Form of man, the Form will be understood fully 
only by someone who has internalized the lessons of the Timaeus 
sufficiently to understand the good served by the existence of human 
beings. Similar conclusions may be drawn even about the Forms of 
artefacts, introduced in Book 10 (596a-b), assuming that these have 
functions subordinate to the human good. 
What has proved much more puzzling is why mathematical 
Forms, such as odd and even, are likewise assumed to be intelligible 
only in the light of goodness. The most promising solution, in my 
view, has been to recognize that Plato's account of the Good would 
itself have been a highly mathematical one.20 This is attested by the 
19
 Cf. 6.506a. 
20
 E.g., Cooper 1977, p. 144 of the reprint. 
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near-contemporary accounts of his public lecture on the Good, in 
which he was said to have disappointed his audience by speaking 
largely of mathematics, and ended up saying something reminiscent 
of the Philebus account of the good in terms of limit and measure, 
probably that "the Good is a unification of limit."21 If discussions in 
the Academy viewed the Good as something like an ideal proportion-
ality, intelligible only through the conceptual framework of a high-
level mathematics, many things are explained, among them ( 1 ) how 
Good might be the ultimate explanatory principle even for math-
ematical entities, while (2) also accounting for such values as Jus-
tice (which, appropriately, Socrates at 4.4430-4443 has represented 
as itself a kind of harmony), (3) why he takes it as read that under-
standing of the Good would require a preliminary ten-year period of 
mathematical study, culminating in harmonics (7.522b-53ic), and 
(4) why no definition of the Good was ever going to be formulated in 
an essentially nontechnical dialogue such as the Republic is.22 
We are now in a better position to clarify what kind of knowl-
edge Plato's philosophers bring to the art of government, and how 
radically it distinguishes them from the benighted prisoners in the 
cave. In its essential character it is mathematical knowledge, albeit 
at a level higher than any of the individual mathematical sciences. 
Its focus is the mathematical principles of proportionality on which 
all lower values ultimately depend. I suspect that, but for the domi-
nant imagery of the cave, the mathematical content of these values 
would have been seen to extend much further down the chain of 
21
 Aristoxenus, Harm. II i, pp. 31.20-31.2 Meibom: kai to peras hoti agathon estin 
hen: like some others (e.g., Popper 1966 [1945], p. 146; Guthrie 1978, p. 424), I 
take to peras ("limit") to be part of what Plato said, and not just an adverbial 
expression meaning "to cap it all." For the definition of good as a unification 
of items previously identified with peras, see esp. Phil. 6581-5. Although I have 
learned much from Burnyeat 2000,1 doubt the specific view he and others defend 
that in Rep. the Good is identifiable with unity. I do not believe that Plato would 
have written about "the One itself" as a special object of arithmetic (7.524d-525a) 
if he had at the t ime of writing identified something of that same name with 
the unhypothetical first principle whose study stands above all the mathematical 
sciences. Undoubtedly, the unity of the city is, as Burnyeat rightly emphasizes, of 
paramount importance to its well-being, but proportionality is itself in turn the 
proper basis of a thing's unity; cf. Tim. 31c, "The finest of bonds is whichever does 
most to unify itself and the things it binds, and proportionality [analogia] is the 
naturally finest producer of this." 
22
 Likewise, the Philebus, whose main focus is on an ideal exemplar of goodness, the 
good life, rather than on the Good itself. 
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transmission than the text of the Republic makes explicit. For exam-
ple, an understanding of justice informed by a prior understanding 
of the Good would be far more technical and mathematical than 
the broad-brush sketches of civic and psychic harmony developed in 
Book 4.23 As early as the Gorgias Plato's Socrates had attributed Calli-
cles' moral ignorance to his neglect of mathematics, there explained 
as his failure to appreciate the power of "geometrical equality," a 
principle of just distribution in proportion to individual deserts that 
might well be expected to enter into the detailed decision-making of 
Callipolis.24 
With due caution, we might compare economic science and its 
acknowledged indispensability to good government in the modern 
world. Comparably, in Platonic ethics mathematical thinking is not 
just a propaedeutic training for philosophical dialectic about values, 
but stands at the very heart of the discipline's methodology. This is 
by no means to suggest that all the detailed decision-making in the 
ideal city will be mathematical in form. But there is good reason to 
assume that the first principles invoked and applied in the course of 
decision-making would regularly exhibit mathematical features.25 
Plato's Socrates never suggests that theoretical understanding of 
the value-Forms is sufficient to make his philosophers successful 
rulers. For that they need an appropriate all-round physical, cultural, 
and military education (Books 2 and 3), and a great deal of practi-
cal administrative experience as well (7.5396-5403). The thesis we 
have been examining up to this point is only that a high-level the-
oretical understanding of values is a necessary condition of skill in 
government. That, however, is already enough to generate the well-
known problem to which I devote the second half of the chapter: 
why, given that they must possess this high-level theoretical under-
standing before becoming rulers, should philosophers want to spend 
their time on the practicalities of government? 
23
 The only hint of this in Rep. is at 9.587b-e, the half-serious calculation that the 
just life is precisely 729 times pleasanter than the unjust. 
24
 Grg. 508a, with the note ad loc. of Dodds 1959; cf. Laws 757b-c. How Plato might 
envisage proportional equality at work in his ideal city can be glimpsed, albeit 
without the mathematics, by comparing the randomly equal distributions charac-
teristic of a democracy, at 8.558c, with the proportionate principles of distribution 
assumed at 4.4336-434^ 
25
 For judicious discussions of the role of mathematics in the philosophers' training, 
see esp. Ferrari 2000, pp. xxix-xxxi, and Burnyeat 2000. 
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I I . W H Y P H I L O S O P H E R S W I L L U N D E R T A K E T O RULE 
In Book ι, long before the idea of designing Callipolis has even been 
broached, Socrates' conversation with Thrasymachus is interrupted 
by an exchange with Glaucon. The exchange eloquently anticipates 
the conversation in the later books where the education of a ruling 
elite is worked out in detail by these same two, Socrates and Glaucon. 
In the Book ι passage, Socrates remarks to Thrasymachus that 
ruling, like any expertise, is essentially altruistic, and that this is 
why those who undertake it have to be rewarded either with money 
or with honor, or compelled by the threat of a penalty. Glaucon butts 
in to ask for an explanation of this third option, compulsion by threat 
of penalty. Socrates replies that money and honor are not motivations 
for the very best people, and continues (i.347b-d): 
For this reason, neither for money nor for honour are good people willing 
to rule. For they don't want either to exact payment for their office openly, 
so as to be called mercenary, or to get it furtively from the office they hold 
and to be called thieves. Nor do they rule for the sake of honour, not being 
honour-lovers (philotimoi). So they have to have compulsion [ananke] and 
penalties applied, if they are going to be willing (ethelein) to rule. That's 
why voluntarily taking on office without waiting to be compelled is liable 
to be considered unworthy. The greatest penalty is that of being ruled by 
one's inferior, if one is not willing to rule. This is the penalty that decent 
people seem to me to be afraid of when they discharge the offices of govern­
ment, and when that happens they enter into government not as if they are 
embarking on something good or are destined to find it a good experience, 
but as something they are compelled to do and on the ground that they don't 
have equals or superiors to entrust with the task. For the probability is that, 
if a city of good men were to come into being, they would vie with each 
other not to govern, just as at present people vie to govern, and that it would 
then become plain that it is not in the nature of a real ruler to look to his 
own advantage, but rather to that of his subject. 
It is extraordinary how intricately this exchange showcases the later 
developments of the dialogue.2 6 The question of what could possi­
bly motivate the best people in a city to undertake government is 
broached in a way that already draws on the three-class structure 
that is developed in the later books, where the lowest or merce­
nary class is motivated by the money-loving part of the soul, the 
Cf. Kahn 1993, p. 138 
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military class by the honor-loving part. This psychology will leave 
no puzzle at all as to what might motivate members of the two lower 
classes to take on political office, should the opportunity arise: there 
is after all plenty of cash and plenty of honor to be earned by rul-
ing. But, Socrates is arguing, there is no analogous reward on offer 
to the best people, since nothing that they want is provided by the 
activities of government. And since no possible enticement could 
persuade them to rule, they would instead have to be compelled 
by threats. Fortunately, however, the most effective such threat is 
one that imposes itself more or less automatically: it consists in the 
fact that, being ex hypothesi the best people in the city, if they decline 
to rule, they will have to put up with being ruled by others worse than 
themselves. 
It is worthwhile to pause on the assumptions underlying these 
remarks. 
First, although the ideas here map fairly accurately onto later 
developments in the Republic, Socrates' argument relies at this stage 
on appeals to experience and to received views. Whereas in later 
books, once the "best" people have been unmasked as philosophers, 
it will be judged problematic how their fellow citizens could actually 
want them to rule, at the present stage they are characterized with 
sufficient looseness to keep any such difficulty hidden. Socrates' 
claim is the ostensibly empirical one that in existing societies, when 
good people take on office, their motivation is the selfish one of 
avoiding subordination to their inferiors. We are, to this extent, not 
yet in the theory-driven world of an ideal city. Nevertheless, it is in 
the lines I have quoted that that celebrated thought-experiment gets 
its very first airing,27 when Socrates envisages an imaginary city 
of good men, who are pictured as competing not to govern. From 
Socrates' passing Utopian remark, combined with the anticipatory 
intervention of Glaucon, the passage gains a pronounced proleptic 
force.28 My plan, partly for this reason, is to use the passage as a lens 
through which to investigate the dialogue's later provisions concern-
ing philosophical government. 
27
 Thus, e.g., Adam 1963 [1902], ad loc: "the first express allusion to an Ideal City 
in the Republic"-, his wording "an Ideal City" rightly allows for the fact that the 
ideal city depicted in later books differs in not consisting entirely of uniformly 
good individuals. 
28
 Cf. Kahn 1993, and, more generally, Kahn 1996. 
2 7 4 DAVID SEDLEY 
But as well as being forward-looking, the passage is also a vital 
bridge from Socratic to Platonic thought. Quite apart from its loca-
tion in the highly Socratic opening book, when it identifies as a 
"penalty" the prospect of being ruled by one's own inferiors it is 
building on a distinctively Socratic theme. For the Socrates of the 
Apology very uncharacteristically claims knowledge of a closely 
related thesis, namely, that it is wrong to disobey one's superior, 
man or god (29b). Although the grounds of this knowledge claim 
have become a subject of controversy, I am inclined to assume that 
Socrates takes it as guaranteed true by the meaning of its own terms: 
if someone is better than you, it goes without saying that that per-
son's judgment as to how you should conduct yourself outweighs 
your own. However construed, the grounds for the Apology thesis 
that it is bad to disobey your superior are likely to be identical to 
those of the Republic thesis, that it is bad to have to obey your 
inferior. 
My next question is what, in this essentially Socratic approach to 
the art of ruling, is the role played by altruism? On the one hand, 
Socrates is emphatic (i.346d-347a) that any expertise [technë], be 
it ruling, medicine, or building, is essentially altruistic in character 
and purpose. On the other, he does not trace that altruism back to 
any moral or other feature of the art's practitioner qua human being. 
If you become a ruler, you are ipso facto committing yourself to 
promoting the good of your subjects; but, as the above quoted passage 
makes plain, absolutely nothing commits you to becoming a ruler. 
On the contrary, if you do choose to become a ruler, that will be 
because you have calculated that, at least by comparison with your 
other options, it is in your own best interests. And this self-interested 
calculation is envisaged as incorporating the assumption that ruling 
is not per se the best activity a good person could engage in. What 
better activity ruling might come second to is not indicated, but the 
silence is one that Book 7 will amply rectify. 
What seems to me most significant, in view of later developments, 
is the following. That there should be something better to do than 
rule is not at this early stage in the discourse introduced as an incon-
venient contingency that somehow has to be catered for. On the 
contrary, Socrates' point is that, in the interests of good government 
itself, things have to be so set up that there is something better that 
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the ruler could have been doing.29 For - so Plato's great political 
insight runs - the only good ruler is a reluctant one. 
This reluctance is expressed in terms that deserve careful note: 
"so they have to have compulsion and penalties applied, if they are 
going to be willing to rule" (1.347c). On the one hand, good people 
will need to have "compulsion" [anankè) applied to them in order to 
get them to rule. On the other hand, as a result of this compulsion 
they will "be willing" (ethelein) to rule. The envisaged compulsion, 
that is, is not brute force operating against their better judgment, 
but the force of circumstances that makes the decision to rule, 
although not their preferred choice, one into which after weighing up 
their options they enter freely. Likewise the envisaged willingness 
does not express their absolute preference, but their acceptance of 
the compulsion that circumstances are exerting. 
It is in Book 7 that these same concerns most recognizably return 
to the surface. The citizens equipped to rule best have by now been 
identified as philosophers. And thanks to the elaborate depiction 
of the philosophers' education we by this stage know a great deal 
about the skills and interests that will ensure that, on the one hand, 
they are uniquely equipped to rule but, on the other, they would 
have preferred not to. Their ruling skill depends primarily on their 
acquaintance with the Forms, thanks to which they alone understand 
and can impose the values that make for a just society. But their 
true passion is for a purely contemplative life devoted to dialectical 
reasoning about the Forms, undiluted by the less fulfilling political 
activity of applying the fruits of that knowledge to the merely human 
society in which they live. 
The notorious puzzle that this gives rise to is why Socrates appears 
confident that the philosophers in his ideal city will actually agree to 
rule. He has compared their dialectical activity, dealing with Forms 
alone, to life outside the cave, their ruling activity to a return to 
the murky depths to order the lives of those less fortunate than 
themselves; and this has made it obvious to Glaucon that the polit-
ical life is less fulfilling for them than the contemplative. Glaucon 
29
 Thus ruling is, in terms of Glaucon's threefold division of goods (2.3573-d), best 
treated as a type (3) good, one like medical treatment, valued only for its con-
sequences and not for its own sake. For the relation of Glaucon's schema to the 
current question, cf. R. Weiss's chapter 4 in this volume, section 4. 
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accepts Socrates' prediction that they will nevertheless obey the 
command to participate in government, citing by way of explana-
tion the fact that they are just (7.520e). But the problem is that jus-
tice has in Books 2-4 been recommended as preferable because in the 
agent's own interest, whereas here we have a case where the philoso-
phers' just act is conceded not to be in their best interest. The just 
act involves choosing a less happy life in place of a supremely happy 
one. Yet, it is predicted, they will choose it. 
This has become a celebrated crux, one on whose solution entire 
reinterpretations of the Republic have been founded. I propose to 
lean on its antecedent in Book 1 in order to narrow down the possible 
solutions, before developing what I take to be the correct one. If the 
solution I shall advocate is right, the text of the Republic is entirely 
and unproblematically consistent in the matter. 
First, we may doubt any interpretation according to which sheer 
moral goodness or understanding is sufficient to motivate the 
philosophers to take on office.30 Certainly, the starting position in 
Book 1, as we have seen, discounted that option, it being only when 
one has already undertaken a craft, be it that of medicine or of rul-
ing, that its altruistic practice becomes an actual commitment. Has 
anything changed relevantly since then? It seems not,31 because the 
same terms are used systematically to describe the philosophers' 
predicament in Book 7 as we encountered in Book 1. Their pref-
erence for a nonpolitical life is, far from being a disqualification, 
the reason par excellence in favor of requiring them to rule (i.347d; 
7-52od, 521b). Getting them to rule will require compulsion (1.347c-
d; 6.499b-c, 50od; 7.519e, 520a, e, 521b, 539e, 540a, b), but in the 
circumstances they will nevertheless "be willing" (1.347c; 7-52od) 
to make the sacrifice. 
30
 E.g., Irwin 1995, sec. 213; Kraut 1991. 
3 1
 In Book 4 the trainee guardians are selected partly for their belief that the city's 
interests are identical to their own (4i2d-4i3d). Has this not, then, separated 
the ideal city's rulers from the self-serving potential rulers considered in Book i, 
and ensured that they are single-mindedly motivated to undertake government? 
It seems not. Although their belief about identity of interest made their ini-
tial training much easier, it was never said to be true, let alone knowledge, 
but repeatedly just a "belief"; and their eventual preference for philosophy over 
ruling, as this emerges in Book 7, seems enough to show that the belief was 
not one that they could still be expected to hold by the time they were fully 
educated. 
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What some interpreters believe to be a relevant change between 
the two passages is the introduction of moral Forms in Books 
5-7. These, it is suggested, provide new motivating factors for those 
few - the philosophers - who have cognitive access to them. In par-
ticular, use has been made of 6.50ob-d, where the philosophers are 
described as naturally inclined to imitate the intrinsic orderliness of 
the Forms so far as they are able, explicitly including the imposition 
of demotic virtue on the souls of the citizens. But the passage is care-
fully cast in the same terms of "compulsion" that we have already 
repeatedly met: the philosopher is indeed bound to imitate in his own 
soul the orderliness of the Forms, but as for his imposition of some 
semblance of that same order on the souls of ordinary citizens, this 
is described as what he will aim to do "if some compulsion [anankê] 
arises" for him to apply his knowledge of Forms to others, and not 
simply to himself (50od). 
An alternative, or complementary, way of securing the desired 
result, albeit this time without any very specific textual support, 
has been to point to the Form of the Good as the new motivating 
factor that transforms philosophers into pure altruists. In particu-
lar, it is sometimes remarked that the Form of the Good is absolute 
good, not someone or other's good. Correspondingly, it is argued, the 
philosophers' supreme desire can no longer be for their own good, 
but simply for the maximization of good wherever the opportunity 
presents itself.32 I do not think there is adequate evidence anywhere 
in the Republic for this account of moral motivation.33 True, the 
Good itself is an absolute value, not anyone's individual or collec-
tive good. But that is simply because it is a Form. Likewise, the large 
itself is pure largeness, not anything's largeness and not largeness 
relative to this or that comparand. Nevertheless, largeness itself can 
never be imposed on the world other than as something's largeness 
32
 Mahoney t992 (esp. p. 280, "the desire for the unrestricted good"); Cooper 1977; 
Annas 1981, ch. io ; Miller 1985; Parry 1996, esp. ch. 4. 
33
 Even at 54oa-e, a passage rightly given special emphasis by Parry 1996, pp. 2ir-r3, 
the motivating force of the Good is subordinated to the familiar need to "compel" 
the philosophers to act with it as their model (540a). Better evidence might seem 
to lie in the Timaeus, where the Demiurge's motivation is simply his wish for 
everything to be good (29e-30a, cf. Parry t996, pp. 202-3). But that is a very special 
case, in that the entire universe is already the object or domain of his craftsmanship. 
It therefore holds no implications for the domain that a lesser expert, such as the 
human philosopher, would be likely to choose. 
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relative to one or more other things. And exactly the equivalent 
goes for goodness itself as well. Thus there is no reason to suspect 
that the philosophers' acquaintance with goodness as a pure Form 
changes the parameters for its imposition on the sensible world or, in 
particular, that it erases whatever initial preference they may have 
for their own good. 
There remains the fact that the philosophers are just and that their 
justice is cited as a motivating factor for their agreement to govern. 
However - a point too often overlooked - the fact that they are just is 
mentioned by Glaucon not as a reason why they will want to rule, but 
why they will be willing, that is, why they will not actually disobey 
the order to do so. The lesson of Book 1, that willingness is a notion 
that for Socrates can operate even when acting under compulsion, 
crucially helps in clarifying this. At 52od-e the following exchange 
takes place: 
"Will our protégés disobey us, do you think, when they hear this, and not 
be willing to take their own individual turns at sharing in the city's work, 
despite most of the time dwelling with each other in purity?" 
"Impossible," said Glaucon, "since we will be giving just orders to just 
people. But the main point is that each of them will approach ruling as a 
necessity - the very opposite of those who currently rule in each city." 
Thus the philosophers' justice contributes to the explanation of their 
decision only to the extent that it throws light on the precise notion 
of compulsion that is being deployed. And I suggest that the missing 
assumption is the following. Just people could never be compelled 
to perform an unjust act, because they would sooner face death, as 
Socrates' conduct testified when he was ordered to take part in an 
unjust arrest [Ap. 32c-e). They can, on the other hand, be compelled 
to perform just acts. And that alone is the point on which Socrates 
and Glaucon are agreeing. 
Nor should we worry that an alien notion of justice has somehow 
intruded, when the philosophers of Callipolis are told (52oa-c) that, 
unlike self-taught philosophers in nonideal cities, they owe a debt 
to their city for their education and that their repaying it is there-
fore just. True, there is a strong resemblance to Simonides' notion of 
justice as repaying what you owe, discussed in Book 1 and rejected 
there with the counterexample of unjustly returning a weapon owed 
to someone who has in the meantime gone mad (1.331c, 3310-332a). 
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But what is being invoked is actually a revised version of that view, 
and one accommodated to the Book 4 definition of justice as psychic 
harmony. For when testing the Book 4 definition, Socrates gave a 
list of "vulgar" examples (4.44264-443311), the first and most elab-
orately worded of which was that someone with psychic harmony 
would be unlikely to refuse to return a deposit (though not explicitly 
that he would never do this): 
For example, if we had to agree about that city, and about the man with a 
nature and nurture that compare with it, whether someone like that seems 
the sort who after receiving a deposit of gold or silver would withhold it, 
who do you think would expect him, more than they would expect those 
who are not of his kind, to behave that way?34 
This picks up the example of returning a "deposit" used in the 
Simonides critique (1.3316-332a) and takes account of that early 
discussion by being formulated cautiously enough to allow for spe-
cial circumstances in which even the Platonically just person would 
refuse to repay what he owes. In this it also anticipates the serious 
possibility that philosophers in Callipolis might, while remaining 
just, find reasons not to repay their education.35 But reminding them 
of the intrinsic Platonic justice of the act - its being the character-
istic behavior of a Platonically just soul - is at least sufficient to 
ensure that they won't resist compulsion, as they would if the act 
were unjust. 
Admittedly, it is notoriously unclear exactly why Socrates and 
Glaucon so readily agree in Book 4 that the Platonically just person 
34
 The translation "more than they would expect" is what underlies my paraphrase 
"unlikely to refuse"; indeed, many translators so render the passage as to make 
degrees of likelihood explicit, e.g., Griffith in Ferrari, 2000: "Could anyone . . . 
imagine such a man to be more likely to do this than people who were different 
from him?" (similarly, Jowett, Shorey, Reeve, and others). An alternative rendi-
tion, "rather than those who are not of his kind" (e.g., Leroux, Grube and Reeve, 
Bloom), would make the assertion less qualified, allowing the possibility that the 
Platonically just man would never withhold a deposit; but even then the degree of 
expectation conveyed by "who do you think would expect him . . .?" would remain 
considerably weaker than in the examples that follow at 443a. 
35
 When at 7.520e Glaucon called it "impossible" that the philosophers would refuse 
to rule, that was explicitly the impossibility of just people refusing to obey a just 
order. The possibility that in other circumstances they might refuse to repay a 
debt would have to represent a case where doing so was unjust, as in the example 
of returning a knife whose owner has gone berserk. 
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would typically repay a deposit.36 But that is a problem for the inter­
pretation of Book 4, and should not be allowed to cast doubt on the 
fact that the justice that in Book 7 plays this subordinate role in 
inducing the philosophers to return to the cave is Platonic justice as 
analyzed in Book 4. 
We are thus brought back to the dominant and constantly repeated 
notion of compulsion as the key to understanding why the philoso­
phers agree to rule. And here once more we can hope to gain illu­
mination from Book I'S anticipation. The references to compulsion 
in Book 7 indicate that "we" - Socrates and his fellow Utopian theo­
rists - will "compel" the philosophers to rule.37 But what form will 
the compulsion take in Callipolis itself? Who or what will replace 
these external legislators? Here, where Book 7 is silent, Book 1 is 
eloquent. The compulsion that drives the best men to rule is there 
explained, not as a coercion institutionally applied by threats and 
other forms of political leverage, but as consisting in the stark nature 
of the choice that faces them. For if they decline to govern, they will 
suffer the worse fate of having to be ruled by their inferiors. And 
therein lies the real compulsion. Once we recognize that the Book 1 
preview has not been superseded but is still operative in Book 7, we 
may usefully draw on it to inform our reading of the "compulsion" 
emphasized in the latter book.38 What really makes it inevitable 
that the philosophers will shoulder the unwelcome duty of govern­
ment is their recognition that, were they not to do so, they would no 
longer live in an ideal city, and would instead be subject to the rule of 
nonphilosophers, their own inferiors. That compulsion by circum­
stances, operative since Book 1, is not in Book 7 replaced by some 
new motivation for undertaking to rule; all that Book 7 adds is the 
reason why the philosophers will not resist the coercion that they 
face, as in other circumstances they might have done.39 
3 6
 The classic formulation of this problem is that of Sachs ^ 6 3 . 
3 7
 Hence at 7.519e it is by "law" that philosophers are required to rule. 
3 8
 Brown 2000, pp. 8-9, puts all the emphasis on compulsion by the external legis­
lators, but his list of passages on "compulsion" (both there and at pp. 5-6) lacks 
the crucial Book r passage. Despite this particular disagreement, I am largely in 
sympathy with Brown's findings. 
3 9
 For example, the Socrates-like philosophers described at 7.520b, who do not owe 
their education to their cities, by implication choose to accept rule by their inferiors 
rather than govern. But why was the threat of rule by their inferiors not sufficient 
to compel them? The reason may well be the impossibility of their participating 
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Is this too reductive an interpretation of "compulsion" to project 
forward into Book 7? It does not, for one thing, yet deal with the 
danger that any one philosopher might become a free rider, opting 
out of government but still enjoying the benefits of rule by his or her 
equals.40 Here at least it may seem preferable for the "compulsion" 
to be understood as a constraint legally enforced by the constitution, 
and not as in effect reducible to the force exerted by a reasoned choice 
between alternatives. In reply, we might borrow another sound bite 
from the Book 1 passage: in a city of good men, Socrates maintained 
there, there would be a competition to get out of ruling, just as there is 
now to rule (347dl. It is easy enough to envisage the system described 
by Socrates in Book 7, whereby the philosophers take it in turns to 
govern, but also not to govern, as the rational settlement they come 
to among themselves. 
In ways such as this, we can narrow if not eliminate the gap 
between the two interpretations of "compulsion": the coercive sense 
in which it designates the apparently external enforcement of struc-
tures on the ideal state and the more benign one signifying the ratio-
nal choices that its citizens make and abide by, given all the fac-
tors and circumstances that constrain their options. Compulsion is 
a notion that is called for above all when creating an ideal city out of 
a préexistent nonideal community. But internally to the running of 
such a city, compulsion in this strong sense becomes largely redun-
dant, and easily gives way to its weaker but more benign counterpart 
advertised in Book 1, namely, enforcement by the dictates of pruden-
tial reason.41 
effectively in the local form of government without committing injustice. If so, 
considerations of justice - the absence of a debt to repay, added to the danger of 
acting unjustly in government - can on occasion motivate philosophers to resist 
the compulsion, whereas in the ideal city it motivates them on the contrary to 
accede to it. 
Cf. White 1986, p. 25. 
My thanks to many participants in the September 2004 Berkeley conference for 
helpful discussion, to Mitch Miller, John Ferrari, Malcolm Schofield, and Nick 
Denyer for an extremely rich array of subsequent written comments, and to Harry 
Adamson for discussion of the issues addressed in the second half of the chapter. 
I also presented papers with much of the same content at a conference held at 
Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, in April 2004, and to an audience at UNC 
Chapel Hill in March 2006; I am grateful for the valuable discussions on those 
occasions too. 
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